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AI solutions can significantly leverage the use of 
OGD ecosystems in public governance. For that, it is 
important to design effective and transparent 
governance mechanisms that create value in an OGD 
ecosystem through AI solutions. By analyzing 
governance challenges associated with OGD and AI 
solutions in public governance, this article presents a 
conceptual framework to design an OGD governance 
model, which adopts a platform governance approach 
and integrates the governance needs derived from the 
use of AI.   
1. Introduction  
The data-driven transformation in public 
administration is hinged on the theoretical premises of 
open government data (OGD) [1]. OGD refers to open 
data that are produced or commissioned by public 
bodies [2]. Open data is defined as the data or the 
content that can be freely used, reused, and distributed 
by anyone, only subject to the requirement that users 
attribute the data and that they make their work available 
to be shared as well. Governments, civil society 
organizations, and private sector representatives 
consider OGD as a building block for open government, 
as they see it as a key enabler of improved service 
delivery, transparency, and public engagement and as a 
result of better relations between governments and 
citizens [2].  
OGD initiatives are expected to foster democratic 
and economic processes by promoting transparency, 
participation and collaboration, and provide 
opportunities for the development of new products and 
services [3]. However, current OGD practices suffer 
from technical, social, institutional/organizational, 
legal/ethical, economic, operational, 
political/policy/strategic challenges [4]. Additional 
challenges emerge when considering the actual use of 
OGD [5]. On the supply side, OGD programs are often 
designed not for citizens but technical experts and 
intermediaries, and the lack of institutional processes for 
dialogue prevents the integration of public feedback into 
existing strategies and programs [6]. On the demand 
side, the lack of incentives, interpretive tools, and 
contextual and technical knowledge among users can 
prevent meaningful data use [7].  
Recently, the adoption challenges of OGD have 
begun to be assessed in the larger institutional landscape 
where the government organizations operate. This 
approach has been conceptualized by the ecosystem 
metaphor to assess the complex dynamics among 
different actors and concerns in the public governance 
domain [8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,5]. In this sense, we use 
OGD governance to refer to the formal and informal 
arrangements that determine how public decisions are 
made and how public actions are carried out in an OGD 
ecosystem.  
In a similar vein, the advancements in big data and 
artificial intelligence (AI) solutions call for the 
reevaluation of effective models for OGD governance. 
Studies show that the combination of AI with OGD has 
a huge potential to improve efficiency, innovation, and 
crime prevention in public governance, but AI is hardly 
used by the public to create value from open data [16]. 
Furthermore, risks of data privacy, and arriving at 
biased or wrong conclusions undermine the usability of 
AI solutions in OGD ecosystems [16]. Therefore, it is 
important to design effective and transparent 
governance and control mechanisms for policymakers 
to create value in an OGD ecosystem through AI 
solutions. 
A particular challenge for the use of digital 
technologies in public governance processes is the 
‘governance of’ and ‘governance by’ configurations 
[17] ‘Governance of’ refers to the design choices 
associated with the digital technologies in accessing and 
using the underpinning data infrastructure. The 
‘governance of’ dimension focuses on how the data 
infrastructure affects the usage of the technology and 
links the data acquisition and data processing 
mechanisms in overall public policy processes. The 
rules and standards in acquiring and processing the 
available data, and how AI affects data processing and 
exploitation stages fall under the ‘governance of’ 
considerations. ‘Governance by’ refers to the use of AI 
in policymaking and policy implementation. Unlike the 
technical emphasis of the former approach, 'governance 
by' prioritizes the techno-social power dynamics and 
control mechanisms in the use of digital technology in 





public policy processes by looking into the role 
ascriptions of automated systems and human agents in 
the overall public governance. A model for OGD 
governance that is compatible with AI solutions should 
comprise both aspects. 
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, by 
elucidating on the theoretical approaches to the OGD 
ecosystem to pinpoint the design principles for OGD 
ecosystem governance. Secondly, based on the 
theoretical and empirical cases to identify the key 
challenges associated with the ‘governance of’ and 
‘governance by’ configurations for the AI-based 
solutions in the public sector. Thirdly, to develop a 
systematic decision-making tool to design a governance 
model for an OGD ecosystem, which integrates the 
governance needs derived from the use of AI. The 
purpose of this tool is to systematically identify and 
analyze the interrelationships among multiple change 
factors on governance design and to project the 
available design options based on the managerial, 
organizational, legal, technological, moral, and 
institutional variances in the OGD ecosystem. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 
categorically presents the existing theoretical 
approaches to OGD ecosystem governance. Section 3 
and 4 elaborate on the governance challenges associated 
with AI solutions in public administration following the 
‘governance of’ and ‘governance by’ dimensions. 
Section 5 presents the systematic decision-making tool 
for the OGD ecosystem design in public governance. 
The conclusion section summarizes the main findings of 
the paper and shares recommendations for further 
research.  
2. Conceptual approaches to OGD 
governance  
The literature provides different conceptual models 
and approaches to the OGD governance design. Based 
on the existing models in the literature, we identify 
seven different approaches to OGD governance design. 
The end of the section presents the common 
denominators of these approaches and highlights the key 
determinants.   
The first approach to OGD governance design is 
based on policy processes in the OGD ecosystem. Reggi 
and Dawes [5] identify two policy cycles in the 
governance of OGD. One policy cycle addresses the 
innovation potential of OGD, the other addresses how 
OGD might support democratic values of participation 
and accountability. The model integrates the diverse 
goals of actors in the open data ecosystem and allows 
the assignment of different role definitions for the 
intermediaries between data providers and the 
beneficiaries of OGD products for innovation, 
participation, and accountability purposes. This model 
allows the integration of techno-social power dynamics 
in the assessment of governance design and tracing the 
influence of actors on the policy processes.   
The second approach to OGD governance design is 
based on contingencies. For instance, Lee et al [12] 
distinguish the external and internal contingencies for 
decentralized and centralized governance approaches in 
terms of the architecture design of OGD governance. 
External contingencies refer to the environmental 
context of a public sector organization, such as 
regulative framework, market structure, social and 
economic dynamics, political and institutional factors. 
Internal contingencies refer to the design choices 
associated with the platform governance conditions 
such as degree of control, type of control and strategies 
for governance. The strength of the model is that it 
creates a dynamic link between the policy goals and the 
underlying system infrastructure in the data governance. 
As such, the model allows estimations of policy 
outcomes based on the changes in the data governance 
architecture and changes in the external and internal 
contingencies (e.g. organizational, regulation, or policy 
changes). 
The third approach in the literature is based on 
system design thinking. Systems thinking is a holistic 
approach that focuses on the way that a system's 
constituent parts interrelate and expounds on how 
systems work over time and within the context of larger 
systems [18]. Following the systems thinking approach, 
Millard [12] defines open governance as linking and 
integrating the worlds inside the government as well as 
linking and integrating these with the worlds outside 
government for the specific purpose of creating public 
value. Accordingly, he identifies three main 
components under open governance systems: open 
assets, open services, and open engagement. Being built 
on the intersections of open assets, open service, and 
open engagement, open government is expected to act 
as a platform, where the government can support a range 
of actors to collaborate with each other, as well as with 
the government itself, by facilitating and orchestrating 
engagements, managing assets, and providing tools to 
generate public value [11]. 
The fourth governance approach to the OGD 
ecosystem focuses on the operational processes in the 
production and reuse of open data. In this approach, 
open data is linked to an open governance strategy in 
which the government builds an open system that 
interacts with its environment [8]. In an exemplary 
model developed by Maretti et al [8], the governance 
choices at the macro-level pertain to the operational 
processes that are the basis of the open data system, 
including the digital strategy of the public 
administrations and the problem of protection and use 
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of data. At the meso-level, governance choices pertain 
to the administrative processes of digital public 
administration. At the micro-level, governance choices 
pertain to the concrete use and reuse of open data in 
formal and informal teams among organizations in 
public administration and civic hackers. In this model of 
OGD governance, the ultimate governance design 
purpose of the government is to structure a participatory 
system that creates economic, political, social, 
operational, and technical benefits for participants. 
The fifth approach to governance design of an OGD 
ecosystem is based on an organizational or institutional 
perspective. This approach relies on the platform theory 
from strategic management and information systems in 
the identification of the governance design constructs 
and distinct approaches for the implementation of OGD 
[9].  The conceptual model developed by Bonina and 
Eaton [9] for the governance of an OGD ecosystem 
brings together those constructs (i.e., core architecture, 
peripheral architecture, platform owner, contributors, 
developers, tools, rules) to analyze the organizational 
tools and resources in the supply and demand sides of 
open governance, as well as the institutional factors 
affecting the overall platform performance. In another 
study, Safarov [10] summarizes these institutional 
dimensions as policy and strategy, legislative 
foundations, organizational arrangements, relevant 
skills and educational support, and public support and 
awareness concerning open data.   
The sixth possible approach to governance design 
is based on the management perspective. In an 
exemplary model for open data assessment framework, 
Welle Donker and van Loenen [13] identify governance 
as a framework of policies, processes, and instruments 
that structure the interaction between public sector 
entities and/or private sector entities to enable parties to 
reach their common goals. In their model, they identify 
five elements (i.e. vision, leadership, communication, 
self-organizing ability, and long-term financing) for 
assessing data governance in open data ecosystems.  
These elements are also influential on the data supply, 
and along with the user characteristics, they constitute 
the input to the ecosystem for the successful reuse of 
OGD. Welle Donker and van Loenen [13] underline 
those other important aspects such as the legal and 
policy frameworks and draw a clear demarcation 
between public tasks and private sector activities that 
additionally affect the performance of the overall 
ecosystem. 
The last approach to governance design is based on 
the commons approach. Commons are based on the 
principles of bottom-up self-organization, the freedom 
of collective agency, polycentrism (multiple loci of 
governance), and subsidiarity (management at the 
lowest feasible level) [19]. According to Ostrom [20], 
the world of natural resources is divided through the 
axes of rivalry and excludability, where the common 
goods refer to the rivalrous and non-excludable 
resources. More recently, the governance of online 
communities has attracted the attention of researchers 
[21], which treat open data as a common good. Fuster 
Morell [22] identifies eight critical aspects that define 
the direction of online creation communities (OCC) 
governance: collective mission or goal of the process; 
cultural principles/social norms; design of the platform 
of participation (where regulation is embedded in the 
code); self-management of contributions; formal 
policies applied to community interaction; license; 
decision-making and conflict resolution systems 
concerning community interaction; and infrastructure 
provision. These eight dimensions are linked to each 
other through the infrastructure provision. According to 
Morrell, infrastructure provision can be modeled across 
two axes: open versus closed to community involvement 
in infrastructure provision, and freedom and autonomy 
versus dependency on infrastructure. Based on the 
empirical analysis of fifty statistical cases and four case 
studies, Morrell clusters four provision models for OCC 
governance: corporation service (which is the case of 
Flickr), mission enterprise (wikiHow), autonomous 
representational foundation (Wikipedia), and assembly 
or assemblarian self-provision models (openesf.net). 
Despite some overlapping dimensions, each 
conceptual approach emphasizes unique aspects based 
on the scope of governance activities. Notwithstanding 
the conceptual differences, we can highlight the 
following common denominators from the existing 
models on the design of OGD governance;  
(1) OGD governance design depends on 
contextual factors such as the regulatory framework, 
organizational capacities, organizational culture, policy 
domain, ethical principles, public policy objectives, etc. 
The available design choices for OGD governance are 
contingent upon these contextual factors. 
(2) OGD governance is most suitable to a platform 
ecosystem model where government and non-
governmental actors can share and reuse the data 
through the platform. Not only the capacities of actors 
involved in the platform ecosystem but also regulations, 
institutional design, and the market structure 
influencing OGD are important for the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the governance design. 
(3) Policy goals, principles, strategies on data 
governance, as well as the managerial, technical, and 
administrative capacities in the ecosystem determine the 
characteristics of the platform ecosystem and the system 
architecture design for the use of digital technologies.   
(4) OGD governance design needs to address the 
role of the actors in the platform ecosystem separately 
as individuals and in communities, as well as holistically 
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assess all the constituent parts of the ecosystem in 
setting the rules of engagements in the use, reuse, and 
share of data.  
3. Governance of AI 
This section expands on the theoretical basis of 
OGD ecosystem governance with the governance 
requirements resulting from the configurations of AI-
based systems in public administration. Particularly, we 
will elucidate the governance of AI-based solutions in 
addressing data acquisition and data processing 
challenges in the OGD ecosystem. 
 
3.1. Data acquisition 
The AI system acquires data by either conducting a 
primary data ascertainment through sensor systems and 
human data input, or by accessing available databases 
(e.g. machine logs, clouds, or Internet databases) in a 
secondary data ascertainment [23]. A data acquisition 
system samples the data input and transforms it into 
machine-readable data, while the software processes the 
acquired data for storage or presentation. The data 
feeding the system and the medium technologies and 
storages integrated into the system are key governance 
considerations in data acquisition. Challenges 
concerning the database size, data integration, data 
quality, and data standards (i.e. how and what data is 
collected, and what format it is stored in) can undercut 
the effectiveness of data processing and AI predictions.  
For a successful implementation of AI strategies 
and programs, organizations must have access to a base 
set of data and must maintain a constant source of 
relevant data to ensure that AI can be useful in the 
selected policy domains. The input data can be in a 
multitude of formats such as text, audio, images, and 
videos. The wide range of sources to collect and store 
these data adds to the governance challenges. For 
successful predictions, all the relevant data must be 
integrated in a manner that the AI can understand and 
transform into useful results. A technological challenge 
for AI-based systems is to analyze unstructured data. 
For example, in healthcare, medical imaging represents 
a large share of relevant data, which even the most 
advanced AI-based systems (e.g. Watson) cannot read 
directly [24]. This means that depending on the data 
source, the AI system may need to be complemented 
with human experience.  
Data quality is another core challenge in data 
acquisition. AI performs best when it has a good amount 
of quality data available to it. Therefore, AI solutions 
built on big data augment the performance of AI-based 
predictions. But big data pools different data from 
different origins that need contextualizing for analyses 
and reports. Greg Hanson from Informatica argues that 
for well-curated data, enterprises should build a catalog 
of data assets and use engineering tools with AI built in 
the backend [25].  
In the public sector, another challenge for data 
quality is the rules and standards employed in publicly 
available data. For example, GDPR obliges the purpose 
limitation principle on data acquisition, which may limit 
the pattern recognition functions of machine-learning 
systems. Therefore, not only the quality of data, but the 
variety of available data can affect the performance of 
AI applications.   
The performance of AI is also related to the quality 
of the training data. Here, bias embedded in the training 
data is one of the biggest challenges that AI faces [26]. 
Often, data sources are laced with racial, gender, 
communal, or ethnic biases [27]. Biases embedded in 
the training data could easily lead to discriminatory and 
unjust consequences in policymaking and 
implementation processes. For example, the 
"Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative Sanctions" (COMPAS), a system to predict 
whether a defendant would re-offend, was found to be 
as successful (65.2% accuracy) as a group of random 
humans [28] and to produce more false positives and 
less false negatives for black defendants [29]. 
Furthermore, data privacy in data acquisition, and 
how to achieve an appropriate balance between privacy 
and data acquisition is another pressing issue in AI 
adoption [30]. Hence, the ethical challenges 
accompanying data acquisition processes need to be 
addressed for the wider adoption of AI-based systems in 
public services.  
 
3.2. Data processing 
The acquired data is stored in data servers for data 
processing. For security or privacy issues, some 
organizations may need to store data on in-house data 
servers. Those organizations need to maintain the cost 
of in-house data servers and a technical support team. 
Cloud-based alternatives, centralized government data 
silos, or digital crossroad data centers present more cost-
benefit-friendly solutions and effective upscaling of AI-
based systems. However, the interoperability 
considerations and administrative burden in data 
acquisition can undermine the appeal of these 
alternative data storage options for organizations.  
The acquired data is processed by algorithms and 
machine-learning techniques. The quality of the human 
resources and available software solutions in data 
analysis are some key considerations for public sector 
organizations. The massive computing power necessary 
to process big data to build an AI system, and to utilize 
data-intensive machine learning systems such as deep 
learning, can also technically and financially challenge 
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organizations. The effectiveness of AI-based solutions 
requires high-end processing power, and the cost of 
large infrastructure requirements are considered as 
impediments to the adoption of AI technology [31]. In 
addition, there is a high demand for a limited number of 
AI experts, which is associated with the increasing cost 
of education and salaries [32]. Cloud computing 
environment and outsourcing can mitigate some 
maintenance costs. Nevertheless, organizations need to 
plan in advance the cost and technical requirements to 
maintain higher computational speed requirements 
along with higher availability of data to scale up their 
AI-based systems.   
The output procured by the machine needs to be 
presented in an easily interpretable way by the user. A 
caveat on data visualization is the phrasing of wording 
and visuals in the analysis results. The confidence 
intervals of the results may vary depending on the 
employed algorithm or statistical techniques, but studies 
on human cognitive bias show that the framing of 
information and behavioral factor tend to affect the 
interpretation of results by the users [33]. There are 
ongoing technical efforts to detect and remove bias from 
AI systems, but these efforts are considered in the early 
stages [34]. A mathematical notion of fairness and 
technological fixes have their limits in overcoming 
systematic and cognitive biases in each social context 
[35]. 
4. Governance by AI 
'Governance by' refers to the use of digital 
technology in policymaking and policy implementation. 
The following subsections will elucidate the governance 
challenges associated with AI-based solutions in 
policymaking and policy implementation. 
 
4.1. Policymaking 
Eggers et al [36] presume that AI can change the 
role of humans in the policymaking processes in four 
ways. First, AI can relieve public workers by taking over 
repetitive tasks, allowing public servants to focus on 
more valuable tasks. Second, AI can help to break up a 
job into smaller tasks and can take over as many of them 
as possible, improving the efficiency of policymaking 
processes. Third, AI can replace a human agent by 
automating policymaking processes. Fourth, AI can 
augment the performance of public servants by 
complementing their skills and improving the 
effectiveness of policymaking processes. While each 
scenario infers diverse efficiency gains in 
policymaking, their disruptive effect on human agents 
in administrative and policymaking processes varies 
drastically.   
By the same token, according to Scherer [37], AI 
presents two risks in policymaking, namely the loss of 
predictability and the loss of control. Loss of 
predictability is caused by big gaps in processing 
capability between AI and human agents, where AI can 
process huge amounts of data at high speeds beyond the 
capabilities of human agents, making the results no 
longer comprehensible and verifiable for humans. 
Thierer et al [38], therefore, define AI-led information 
processing systems as 'black box' for human end-users, 
turning their role as data feeder and recipients of results 
without the ability to control the validity of methods and 
criteria in policymaking. Loss of control refers to the 
dislocation of human control in influencing the system 
operations. The self-learning mechanisms of AI allow it 
to reprogram itself for process optimization, and the 
personnel responsible for maintenance and monitoring 
of the system can partially or completely lose the ability 
to realign the system with policy objectives.  
Furthermore, AI-led policymaking is stranded by 
the legal, moral, and ethical framework conditions. 
Human decisions in public policy are political in nature 
and soft skills such as ethical trade-offs, social rules, 
empathy, humanity, and conscientiousness have a 
conclusive influence on the outcome of decision-
making processes and their subsequent evaluation [23]. 
For the moment, AI technology lacks these human 
cognitive qualities and has limitations to take over 
human roles in public decision-making processes [39].   
The use of AI in policymaking also raises concern 
about its behavioral impact on human-led decision-
making processes. For instance, a study on an automated 
profiling system for unemployment claims in Poland has 
found that less than 1 in 100 decisions made by the 
algorithm have been questioned by the responsible clerk 
[40]. Behavioral factors such as lack of time to ponder 
the details, fear of repercussions from the supervisors, 
and a belief in the objectivity of the process appear as 
driving influences behind the behavior of clerks, making 
human-led decision-making processes practically 
automated systems [41].  
By taking into consideration these potential 
challenges, Janssen and Kuk [42] envisage governance 
by AI can at best be used only on mundane tasks. 
Similarly, Eggers et al [36] underline that AI is most 
suited to handle repetitive, highly structured, and 
regulated work processes. They recommend 
organizations issue a work structure and process 
analysis regularly to draw up the respective areas of 
application for AI in policymaking. However, this 
caveat does not necessarily pertain to the capabilities of 
AI technologies, rather to the task encroachment and 
accountability risks imposed by advanced AI solutions 
in public administration, as a growing number of use 
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cases show that AI solutions are becoming more attuned 
to handle complex and cognitive tasks [43].  
 
4.2. Policy implementation 
AI can replace the role of human agents over the 
delivery of public services, and engage with end-users, 
not only in policymaking but also in policy 
implementation. AI-led bots and AI-powered digital 
interfaces can especially replace public servants for 
repetitive and predictable tasks. Many authors even 
highlight the risk of increasing the replacement of 
human agents in healthcare, education, logistics, and 
organizational processes, which raises the threat of mass 
unemployment in various public sector areas [44]. 
Nonetheless, the wider usage of AI in policy 
implementation can also create new jobs and roles in 
public services. Skills in algorithms and the use of AI in 
systems have already become high-demanded skills in 
the job market [45]. Not only the technical staff but also 
public managers are required to enlarge the working 
capabilities by AI usage and to develop a better 
understanding of how AI can supplement the workforce 
to achieve better results faster [36]. The challenge is, 
however, the technical and managerial staff or the 
people working in the jobs at risk do not necessarily 
have the required skills and formal training to ease the 
pressure on human resource management in public 
administration.  
The impact on the workforce is only one 
governance consideration for AI usage in policy 
implementation. AI safety and end-user behaviors are 
other concerns in the governance by AI. AI safety refers 
to assuring the secure performance and impact of AI 
[46]. These safety concerns not only relate to issues of 
information security, but also to complex and safety-
critical situations resulting from circumstances where 
the AI may learn negative behavior from its 
environment and misunderstand its surrounding [47]. 
Taking the necessary precautions and safety measures 
are important for the scope of AI applications. Bostrom 
and Yudkowsky [48] underline the necessity of AI 
technology to be resilient against adverse manipulation 
by humans. For AI applications based on reinforcement 
learning and automated executions, safety measures 
need to be in place to avoid catastrophic consequences. 
It is also important to avoid negative side effects to the 
working environment during the learning process of AI 
applications [49].   
Lastly, studies show that the uptake of new services 
by AI-bots has not been particularly high, leading the 
authorities to believe that some form of proactive 
marketing would be necessary to change citizens’ 
behavior [41]. Kuziemski and Misuraca [41] assert that 
to pursue such projects further, local authorities need to 
develop user experience and awareness. However, user 
experience and awareness cannot be enhanced solely by 
marketing practices, and trust in public administration is 
important to facilitate the transition. Especially, recent 
studies suggest that public service processes have a 
significant impact on citizens´ trust in public 
administration, and in particular the absence of 
corruption is a strong institutional determinant in 
trusting public administration for the use of digital 
technologies [50]. Therefore, holistic approaches are 
needed in service design to leverage AI technology in 
service provider and citizen interactions.  
5.  A conceptual framework to design AI 
compatible OGD governance 
In this last section, we present a conceptual 
framework to design an OGD governance model, which 
adopts a platform governance approach and integrates 
the governance needs derived from the use of AI.  
The purpose of this tool is to systematically identify 
and analyze the interrelationships among multiple 
change factors on OGD governance design and to 
project available AI-based solutions for the OGD 
ecosystem by assessing the managerial, organizational, 
legal, technological, moral, and institutional variances. 
Through the recursive and reflexive analysis of each 
step, policymakers and system designers can develop 
reliable strategies in leveraging AI solutions for the use 
of OGD in public governance.  
Figure 1 presents the six steps in the design of an 
AI-compatible OGD governance. Each of these steps is 
elaborated on below.  
 
Figure 1. The 6-step model in designing AI 
compatible OGD governance  
 
 
Step 1: Identifying contingencies  
According to Lee et al. [12], characteristics of 
platform governance are influenced by external and 
internal contingencies. External contingencies refer to 




•Who are the data providers and users in the 
ecosystem?





•What are the data governance 
roles in the OGD ecosystem?
Design values
•What are the external and internal 
values in the use of OGD?
•What are the external and internal 
values in the use of AI?
Governance of 
•What is the governance model of AI for 
data acquisition?
•What is the governance model of AI for 
data processing?
Governance by  
•How is the policymaking 
governed by AI?
•How is the policy implementation 
governed by AI? 
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the environmental context of a public sector 
organization, such as regulative framework, market 
structure, social and economic dynamics, political and 
institutional factors. For example, in the OGD context, 
some external contingencies can be related to the 
legislation and regulations governing the collection and 
the reuse of publicly available data. External 
contingencies also pertain to the data feeders in the 
ecosystem. For instance, the sources of data and its 
formation (single or multiple sources), the role of public 
and/or private organizations in the ecosystem, and the 
data quality and control standards are some aspects of 
market structure.  
External contingencies also influence the choices in 
internal contingencies. Compared to external 
contingencies, internal contingencies are the more 
immediate and direct causes of the characteristics of the 
platform. Internal contingencies are platform strategy, 
multi-homing strategy, governance configuration, open 
strategy, and platform maturity [12]. Platform strategy 
pertains to the rules on access, control, data provenance, 
conformance, and monitoring the quality of OGD. 
Multi-homing and open strategy respectively pertain to 
the rules of access and the reuse of OGD by the platform 
users. Governance configuration pertains to how a 
desirable behavior in the platform is achieved based on 
authority- or trust-based formations. Lastly, platform 
maturity pertains to the level of participation and the 
critical mass of data accumulated in the platform.  
Hence, the first step in OGD governance design is 
the identification of external contingencies that may 
impede the available design choices in platform 
governance. Subsequently, the effect of external 
contingencies on existing strategies, internal and 
external rules, and structures for the platform 
governance needs assessment. For example, political 
scandals and previous cases with fraud may prioritize 
transparency and privacy considerations in the design of 
platform governance. It is important to highlight that the 
contingencies also depend on the outcomes of AI 
applications in platform governance (see the feedback 
loop in Figure 1). Therefore, an iterative and dynamic 
process is called for in the identification of 
contingencies.  
 
Step 2: Identifying data prosumers 
Data prosumers are the organizations, individuals, 
and automated agents supplying raw and/or processed 
data in the platform and reusing the data for public, 
commercial, social, or academic purposes. In a platform 
ecosystem, the data prosumers can be public or private, 
and they could be communities or individual users that 
can access and reuse the data available in the platform. 
This step is not only about identifying data providers 
(and beneficiaries of OGD) but also about assessing the 
existing capacities among prosumers, and about 
cultivating the data for the growth of the platform 
ecosystem. For example, in a system dominated by a 
few main data providers, the data storage and processing 
capacities of those organizations would eventually 
delimit the growth and the big data potential of the 
ecosystem. Depending on the technological choice in 
AI-based solutions, the role of data prosumers may vary. 
For example, in big data-led AI systems, private sector 
organizations holding large amounts of data may have a 
more important role in data production.     
   
Step 3: Assigning data governance roles 
Lee et al. [12] identify four main data governance 
roles in a platform ecosystem: data committee, data 
manager, data owner, and data subject. The data 
committee is responsible/accountable for clarifying the 
role of data in the platform ecosystem [51]. It makes 
decisions about the purpose of data use, desirable 
behaviors, and appropriate governance mechanisms, 
aligning business goals. The role is generally taken by 
the orchestrator of the platform owner. Data manager 
refers to the role of data management in the platform 
ecosystem including data collector, data steward, and 
data custodian. It is responsible for the implementation 
of data management tasks and verifying the 
conformance of data governance rules. The role also can 
be shared with platform users as they can monitor or 
audit the use of data. The data owner is an individual (or 
company) who owns data by uploading user content or 
profile, or by providing the result of analytics jobs to the 
platforms. The data subjects are the people whose 
personal data are used in the ecosystem and who are 
identified or identifiable (Art. 4.1 of the GDPR). The 
process of assigning data governance roles in an OGD 
ecosystem requires the interactions between public and 
private stakeholder organizations. The level of trust 
vested in public and non-public actors as well ownership 
of AI technologies may determine the role and power 
distributions in platform governance. A key challenge 
for system designers is to create a transparent and 
inclusive governance mechanism in the distribution of 
data governance roles that engender legitimacy and trust 
in public governance processes.  
 
Step 4: Identifying design values 
Design values stem from the internal and external 
value propositions associated with the use of OGD and 
AI in public governance. Internal values represent the 
value of OGD and AI-based solutions to a particular 
organization based on organizational, technical, and 
managerial investment requirements and expectations. 
External values stem from the expectations from the 
platform users and beneficiaries on the (re)use of OGD 
and AI in public policy processes and service 
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provisions. For example, improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness in policymaking processes concerning tax 
fraud detection by leveraging machine learning 
algorithms is an example of an internal value 
proposition. Alternatively, protecting the privacy rights 
and business interests of platform users are forms of 
external value propositions. An effective governance 
design process needs to identify the value propositions 
associated with the way OGD is used and align the value 
propositions with data governance goals, in an order of 
importance.  
Indubitably, the values are subjective to the actors 
involved in data governance and the choice of particular 
value propositions might incur trade-offs and political 
costs. Therefore, it is not an easy task for policymakers 
to create an ordinance among value propositions. It is 
also possible different prosumers may have 
contradictive value propositions or expectations in data 
governance. Therefore, the involvement of the 
prosumers in this stage is necessary to understand the 
value hierarchies of prosumers and thereby to design 
more legitimate platform governance. A possible 
methodological tool to that end is the means-end chain 
(MEC). MEC is a formal heuristic tool to define a 
hierarchy of goals and values that represent potential 
identities of the actions necessary for the person to reach 
his or her goal [52]. In a classical MEC, goals are 
grouped through four stages in a value chain: attributes 
(concrete and abstract attributes of a goal), the 
functional consequence of attributes (immediate, 
tangible effects on the user), the psychological 
consequence of attributes (the emotional impact on the 
user), and values (the emotional state-of-mind the user 
is trying to achieve). According to Gutman [52], MEC 
provides a flow toward desired ends at successively 
higher levels of abstraction extending from the product 
or service to important aspects of consumers' self-
concepts. In doing so, MEC creates hierarchically 
related sets of elements across levels of abstraction and 
allows differentiating goals from values. As Gutman 
puts it, goals represent what we want, and values are 
why we want them.   In an exemplary study on the 
choice of beverage, while studying for a test, first-year 
marketing students in a New England university replied 
to a series of 'why' probes to elucidate the 
instrumentality of an act (e.g. drinking a particular 
beverage) in goal attainment [52]. The answers of 
students were processed through a laddering 
methodology and presented as a hierarchy of goals and 
value propositions associated with the choice of 
beverage (e.g. coffee or soft drink).   
 
Step 5: Designing the governance of AI 
Preferences in the design values directly influence 
the choice of AI-based solutions to process the data in 
the OGD ecosystem. AI-based solutions (e.g. machine 
learning, advanced analytics techniques) may have 
different governance attributions in the system 
architecture choices, with different value propositions 
and trade-offs influencing the architecture design of the 
platform ecosystem. Therefore, the design principles 
and data governance goals set in the previous steps 
delimit the choice with AI solutions and type of data (e.g 
closed or private) brought in data acquisition and data 
processing processes. Additionally, considerations 
about technology readiness and maturity, associated 
organizational and human resource capacities, 
transparency, explainability, and interoperability of AI 
solutions are other important issues that can delimit the 
available choices in AI solutions and their inclusion in 
the OGD ecosystem.  
 
Step 6: Designing the governance by AI 
The last step in the governance design of an AI-
compatible OGD ecosystem is evaluating the 
adaptability of policymaking and policy implementation 
processes with AI solutions. Techno-social power 
dynamics among data prosumers, control and incentive 
mechanisms to share and (re)use data in public policy 
processes, safety, and privacy considerations, and the 
role distributions among automated and human agents 
in public governance must be considered. The policy 
choices on the use of AI solutions in the OGD 
ecosystem and their policy outcomes are expected to 
affect, in time, the roles of prosumers and their 
involvement in platform governance. Therefore, it is 
important to envisage effective risk and change 
management mechanisms to adjust changes in user 
behaviors. For that, there is a need for periodic re-
evaluation of the relevance of the existing policy goals 
and contingencies by strategic planning and 
management teams, to ensure the sustainability of the 
OGD governance design. 
6. Conclusion 
The integration of OGD ecosystems with AI-based 
solutions can significantly improve the effectiveness of 
data-driven policies in public governance. In this article, 
we first identified the existing governance approaches 
and key design considerations in the governance of an 
OGD ecosystem, and later elaborated on the governance 
design challenges derived from the technological 
properties of AI-based solutions in the public sector 
domain. Through the synthesis of governance 
challenges associated with OGD ecosystem design and 
the use of AI in the public domain, we developed a 
conceptual framework to act as a decision-making 
heuristic for policymakers to develop reliable strategies 
in exploiting AI and OGD in public governance.   
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With this analytical tool, policymakers and system 
designers can systematically analyze the compatibility 
of available AI solutions to the needs and requirements 
of data prosumers in an OGD ecosystem. Policy choices 
with values and contingencies are dependent on the area 
of application, maturity of existing data governance 
systems, and institutional contexts. To ensure the 
effectiveness of policy design processes using this tool, 
the implementation of effective feedback mechanisms 
and periodic assessments with relevant stakeholder 
organizations are important. For that public sector 
organizations need to develop the necessary consulting 
and deliberation mechanisms.  
Several issues remain to deliberate further about 
how AI can best be used to leverage OGD in public 
value creation. First, AI adoption in the public sector is 
influenced by various institutional, legal, cognitive, 
political, technical factors that create a distinction 
between available and desirable technological solutions. 
Furthermore, concerns about transparency and 
accountability of machine learning systems, task 
encroachment on human’s role in public administration, 
lack of data analytics skills in the public domain, and 
biased datasets to supplement learning mechanisms put 
a strain on the use of advanced AI solutions in the public 
sector. These concerns inevitably limit the effective 
integration of available AI technologies within OGD 
platforms.  
Secondly, both OGD and AI governance are 
contingent upon the (mis)match of value propositions 
imposed by various actors participating in platform 
governance. These value propositions are not fixed and 
are subjected to change in user behaviors and 
consequential events that can undermine the trust 
toward the role of public and private sector 
organizations in data governance. We need further 
research to understand better the underlying 
mechanisms between the use of AI and OGD solutions 
and citizen trust, and public value creation.    
Third, for the moment, most data-sharing services 
are derived from centralized servers in the public sector 
domain and/or big data repositories controlled by profit-
based organizations. This centralized constellation 
might be beneficial for the implementation of AI 
technologies to improve the efficiency of public service 
processes, but in the long run, might undermine the 
wider adaptability of AI solutions in public governance. 
The inclusion of other digital solutions such as self-
sovereign identity and blockchain technologies might 
improve the quality of OGD and facilitate the adoption 
of more advanced AI solutions in public governance. 
However, for the moment, we lack an empirical and 
theoretical basis on how best to introduce these various 
technologies to leverage OGD in public governance. 
Further theoretical and empirical research is needed to 
understand the governance implications of these 
decentralized technologies in the use of OGD and AI in 
public governance. 
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